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RECENT DECISIONS
Landlord and Tenant - Availability to Landlord of Statutory Sum-
mary Proceeding for Breach of Condition in Lease - Plaintiff leased to
defendant certain commercial property for a term of years. The lease
provided that if the tenant defaulted in the performance of any provi-
sion therein, and remained in default for 15 days after notice, then, "at
the option of the landlord," the lease would terminate, in which event
the landlord might "re-enter the premises and remove all persons there-
from." Plaintiff landlord instituted a summary proceeding to evict de-
fendant for alleged violations of the lease. Held: Provision in lease
was a condition subsequent, and, on default of tenant, landlord's only
remedy would be ejectment, not summary process. Hayman v. Butler
Bros., 196 Misc. 641, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 148 (1949).
The summary proceeding to remove a tenant, known as such in
New York, as unlawful detainer in Wisconsin, and by various other
names in other jurisdictions, is entirely statutory.' The remedy pro-
vided is a speedy one and greatly advantageous to the landlord, who
is not forced as at common law to an expensive, time-consuming action
in ejectment. But because the proceeding is statutory, it is held that it
can only be maintained for the causes specifically mentioned in the
statute.
2
In New York the courts hold that for breach of a provision in a
lease which is merely a condition subsequent, the landlord cannot re-
gain the premises by means of the summary remedy, precisely because
the statute of that state has not provided that the proceeding is avail-
able to a landlord for such cause.3
the employer is subject to an action for discriminatory discharge under Sec-
tion 111.06 (1) (a) and (c) Wis.. Stats. of 1947. (Richard Planer v. Laundry
and Dry Cleaning Drivers, Local No. 360, I.B. of T.C.S. and H. of A., Affili-
ated with AFL and others, Decision No. 127 (WERB, 1940); Maurice P.
Kent v. Federal Labor Union 20741; and the Island Woolen Co., Decision No.
143 (WERB, 1940); Emily Horton v. C. A. Neuburger Co., Decision No. 378
(WERB, 1942) ; Rose Roberts v. Oshkosh Trunk and Luggage, Inc., Decision
No. 392 (DERB, 1942); L. E. Tarrell v. Fox Head Waukesha Corp. and Local
Union No. 102 International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal aid Soft
Drink Workers of America, Decision No. 470 (WERB, 1942); William A.
Myer v. Wisconsin Motor Corporation and International Union UAAAIW,
Local No. 283 CIO, Decision No. 521 (WERB, 1943); Louis Nulju, Ray
Bommert, August Harthun and Leonard Galbrecht v. International Harvester
Co. and Federal Labor Union No. 22621 AFL, Decision No. 1179 (WERB,
1946); Victor Morran v. Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co., Decision No.
1291 (WERB, 1947); Robert C. Schroeder v. J. P. Cullen and Son, Decision
No. 1329 (WERB, 1947); Myrtle Kellnahauser and Rosina Andreshak v.
Mathie-Ruder Brewing Co., Decision No. 1506 (WERB, 1948).) However the
contract cases of unfair labor practice, though not infrequent, can be avoided
if employers are made aware of the procedural steps necessary to a valid
union protective agreement and the import of the particular agreement that
they become a party to, through adequate legal counseling.
152 C.J.S. 610: Hartnip v. Fields, 247 Wis. 473, 19 N.W. 2d 878 (1945).
2 52 C.J.S. 611; Beach v. Nixon, 9 N.Y. 35 (1853); Kramer v. Amberg, 15 Daly
205, 4 N.Y.S. 613 (1889), affirmed 115 N.Y. 655, 21 N.E. 1119 (1889); Risen-
feld v. R-W Realty Co., 223 App. Div. 140, 228 N.Y.S. 145 (1928).
3 Beach v. Nixon, supra note 2.
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However, the New York statute does provide for the summary
process in cases of the tenant's holding over after expiration of the
term. This provision has been construed in New York to apply not
only to cases where the lease has terminated by lapse of time, but also
to where the lease has terminated by a conditional limitation.4 A con-
ditional limitation in a lease, as distinguished from a condition subse-
quent, is a provision under which the lease is to terminate, ipso facto,
upon the happening of a contingency set forth in the lease.5 Thus, if
a lease provides that it shall be terminated by some future happening,
and that event comes to pass, the term is absolutely ended, the tenant
is a hold-over, and the summary proceeding may be maintained.6
On the other hand, a condition subsequent in a lease is a provision
whereby, should the tenant breach the condition, the landlord at his
option may terminate the lease by an action in ejectment.7 The breach
does not determine the tendency, it merely gives the landlord the right
to do so, which right he can exercise or not, as he elects.8 But he can-
not maintain the summary proceeding because the tenant is not a hold-
over.9 In short, it may be said that the breach of a condition subsequent
merely renders the lease voidable, while the operation of a conditional
limitation renders it void.'"
It would seem from the foregoing that the test to distinguish be-
tween a conditional limitation and a condition subsequent would be to
determine whether or not the termination of the lease was at the option
of the landlord. But the New York courts, in the course of over a cen-
tury of litigation under the statute, have come to the view that such
is not the test." In Reisberg v. Ownit Realty Corp.2 the court said:
"The test, to distinguish between conditional limitation and con-
dition subsequent, is not whether the termination is at the option
of the landlord, but whether the lease evinces a clear intention
that an event, even though its occurence is optional with the
landlord, shall, when it transpires, end the lease as if it by its
terms had been limited to that time."
The vast distinction is immediately apparent, as are the conse-
quences of such a view. The landlord's use of the summary remedy
4 Miller v. Levi, 44 N.Y. 489 (1871) ; Martin v. Crossley, 46 Misc. 254, 91 N.Y.S.
712 (1905); Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., Inc., 132 Misc.
435, 230 N.Y.S. 239 (1928) (discussed in 38 Yale L.J. 262).
5 52 C.J.S. 630; Beach v. Nixon, supra note 2.
6 Supra note 4.
7Niles, Conditional Limitations in Leases in New York, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 15
(1933).8 Supra note 7.
9 Supra note 3.
10 Supra note 7.
I Reisberg v. Ownit Realty Corp. et al, 133 Misc. 156, 231 N.Y.S. 42 (1928);
Raywood v. Holden, 134 Misc. 443, 235 N.Y.S. 677 (1929).
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is not restricted to cases where the lease is determined by an event
provided for in the lease and thenceforward out of his control. The
event may be at his option, and still the provision will be a conditional
limitation, as long as the event, and not the landlord's option, operates
to terminate the lease. Thus it is held in New York that where, under
provisions of a lease, the landlord is to have the option of terminating
the lease, for instance for breach of condition subsequent, by giving
notice that it will terminate on a certain date, a conditional limitation
is created, and the summary proceeding may be maintained, since the
notice, and not the exercise of the landlord's option, terminates the
lease, even though the landlord has exercised his option in causing
that event to come about. 13 Such a holding would suggest the very
fine dividing line between conditional limitations and conditions sub-
sequent and the necessity of a carefully worded lease if the landlord
is to preserve his ability to avoid an ejectment action and avail himself
of the summary proceeding.'4
In Wisconsin, the distinction between conditional limitations and
conditions subsequent, a very real problem in New York because of
the wording and interpretation of the statute of that state, is under
our unlawful detainer statutes 5 unnecessary for the very reason that
it is necessary in New York, i.e. the grounds for which the statutory
proceedings may be maintained. The Wisconsin statute allows an unlaw-
ful detainer action for breach of condition subsequent by the tenant.',
The cases show many actions brought for such cause where the provi-
sions in the lease creating the condition subsequent would be precisely
the type which would bar the action in New York.17
A comparison of the two statutes in this regard indicates that the
legislative purpose in New York was to more closely guard the tenant's
estate than in Wisconsin, for the breach of a condition subsequent and
the re-entry by the landlord works a forfeiture of that estate before
the term expires, while the working of a conditional limitation termin-
ates the estate as if the lease had, by its terms, been limited to that time,
and there is no forfeiture.h However, in the final analysis it would
seem that, regardless of the legislative purpose a century and a quarter
ago, both statutes now accomplish the same purpose, despite a different
manner of approach. ROBERT F. BODEN
12 133 Misc. 156, 231 N.Y.S. 42 (1928).
I3 Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., Inc., supra note 4; Reisberg
v. Ownit Realty Corp., supra note 11; Raywood v. Holden, supra note 11.
'4 Supra note 7.
IS Wis. Stats., Ch. 291 (1949).
1' Wis. Stats., 291.01(3) (1949).
17 Tower Bldg. Corp. v. Andrew, 191 Wis. 269, 210 N.W. 842 (1926); Rupp v.
Board of Directors of Assembly No. 58 of the Equitable Reserve Association,
244 Wis. 244, 12 N.W. 2d 26 (1943).
1s Supra note 7.
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